The Generality Problem for Intellectualism, forthcoming in Mind and Language [pre-print].

Argues that Intellectualists ought to provide us with an account of the generality of the methods that figure in the propositions which they claim are involved in knowledge-how, that this problem is analogous to the Generality Problem for reliabilism, and that lots of prima facie plausible ways to give an account of the generality of these methods fail (This paper is basically a longer and much less amusing version of this sketch).

Knowledge-How, Abilities and Questions, forthcoming in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 

Argues for a novel theory of knowledge-how as a distinctive kind of ability to answer a question, what I call an ability to answer a question on the fly. One can think of this view as a kind of compromise between Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism, that combines the idea that knowledge-how is an ability, with the standard question-based semantics for interrogative complements (like ‘how to swim’) [pre-print].

Draft paper, along with presentation and commentaries from Evan Riley, Carlotta Pavese, and Jay Spitzley here.


Knowledge-How is the Norm of Intending, in Philosophical Studies, online first [pre-print]

Makes the case for an epistemic norm on intending(roughly: that one must know how to do what one intends to do), based on extensions of arguments used in favour of other epistemic norms.

Knowledge-How, Showing and Epistemic Norms, in Synthese online first [pre-print]

This paper centres around cases for knowledge-how that are analogous to Lackey’s Creationist teacher, using them to criticise the a knowledge-how norm on showing (roughly: that one must know how to do what one teaches others to do). A central example is Carmine Caruso, who is a super cool person to know about.

Knowledge-how: Free Relatives and Interrogatives, in Episteme First View [pre-print]

Argues that treating the ‘how to swim’ in the sentence ‘Jane knows how to swim’ as a free relative (rather than as an interrogative) is linguistically implausible, and that this causes a problem for Bengson and Moffett’s Objectualist account of knowledge-how.


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